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In Defense of an Embattled Mode of
Advocacy: An Analysis and Justification of
Public Interest Practice
Supporters of the Administration plan [to eliminate federal funding
of the Legal Services Corporation] ... see it as a way of striking a
blow against activist lawyers who, in their view, stir up unnecessary
trouble. Mr. Reagan and other critics, from time to time, have
accused legal aid attorneys of being too quick to pursue their own
vision of the public interest.'
Under the guise of helping the poor, these taxpayer-funded social
engineers have promoted militant extremism, graduated state income
tax, student protests, racial quotas in employment and education,
increased government welfare programs, Indian land claims,
homosexual demands, rent strikes and boycotts of private businesses.
. . . [The program's] purpose and its impact is to change and, in
effect, to make law. No other face can be put on it.
2
Public interest law3 emerged as a significant force in the legal
profession in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although the total remained
1. Taylor, Legal Aid for the Poor Did Work, and That's the Rub, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, §
E, at 3, col. 1.
This Note was written before current attacks on the Legal Services Corporation reached their peak.
Thus it does not directly analyze the details of the administration's proposals.
2. MacKerron, Legal Services Corp. Supporters Fear It May Be 'Block Granted' to Death,
NAT'L J., Feb. 28, 1981, at 360 (quoting Senator Jesse Helms).
3. The term "public interest" law was first applied in the mid-1960s to the work of legal groups
making efforts to secure legal services for those unable to obtain them through normal channels. See
Cooke, Public Interest Law and Lawyers for the Public Interest, 34 REC. N.Y. CITY B.A. 6, 7 (1979).
Today, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the
Public Citizen Litigation Group, and the Environmental Defense Fund are regarded as typical
"public interest" law groups. See D. CLOVIS & N. ARON, SURVEY OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
CENTERS app. B (1980); B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER, & N. KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 76-79
(1978).
It is difficult to identify the unique features of public interest practice. For a typical definition, see
D. CLOVIS & N. ARON, supra, at 1 n.** ("non-profit, tax-exempt group that devotes a large share of
its program to providing legal representation to otherwise unrepresented interests in court or
administrative proceedings involving questions of important public policy"). Some of the typical
structural characteristics of traditional public interest lavw groups-for example, nonprofit status-are
shared by recently formed organizations that pursue very different goals. See id. at 6 (describing
recent growth of business-oriented "public interest" legal groups); The Naderites of the Other Side,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1979, § 3, at 7, col. 1 (describing "free-enterprise-oriented" groups).
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small,4 the number of public interest lawyers and legal organizations
increased significantly during this period.' Public interest lawyers made
important contributions to civil liberties, civil rights, environmental, and
consumer protection law.6 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the
fragility of public interest practice became startlingly apparent. The
growth of public interest practice virtually ceased,7 financial support
began to falter,8 and the critics of public interest law became increasingly
strident. Adversaries directed many of their attacks at the methods used by
public interest lawyers.9
Current attacks on public interest law are attributable, at least in part,
to public interest lawyers' failure to develop an adequate theoretical
justification for their work. In particular, they have failed to explain some
of the most controversial techniques of public interest representation. This
Note seeks to develop a coherent justification for the use of activist
methods by the public interest bar. It explores the systematic inequalities
among individuals and groups in their ability to take advantage of the
4. Ambiguity in the definition of public interest practice, see note 3 supra, makes the phenomenon
difficult to quantify. Various estimates of the number of public interest lawyers and legal groups have
been given. See, e.g., D. CLOVIS & N. ARON, supra note 3, at 2 (Council for Public Interest Law's
survey in 1979 and 1980 found 117 public interest law centers employing 711 attorneys); COUNCIL
FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 81-82 (1976) (92 public interest
firms identified; 86 that completed survey employed 589 lawyers); Marshall, Financing Public
Interest Law Practice: The Role of the Organized Bar, 61 A.B.A.J. 1487, 1488 (1975) (250 public
interest lawyers among 355,000 members of legal profession).
5. See D. CLOVIS & N. ARON, supra note 3, at 6 (between 1969 and 1975, 78 new public interest
law centers opened); B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER, & N. KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 50 (61 public
interest law firms established between 1969 and 1975).
6. Public interest lawyers have been involved in many recent landmark cases. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion statutes unconstitutional); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (per curiam) (death penalty statutes unconstitutional); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (one-year welfare residency requirement unconstitutional); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (establishing new police interrogation procedures); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (de jure school desegregation unconstitutional). See generally Denvir, Towards a Political
Theory of Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1133, 1133 & n.2 (1976) (review of landmark
public interest litigation); B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER, & N. KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 151-470
(review of public interest lawyers' achievements).
7. See D. CLOVIS & N. ARON, supra note 3, at 6 (only 23 public interest law centers opened
between 1975 and 1979; only one in 1979).
8. Between 1975 and 1980, the total income of public interest law organizations increased by only
two percent in real terms, from $40,076,000 to $52,803,115. D. CLOVIS & N. ARON, supra note 3, at
12. But the number of centers also increased from 86 to 110 during the same period. Id. As a
consequence, many public interest law centers are now in a precarious financial position. See id. at
10, 12 (wealthiest 15 groups receive approximately half of total support, and 60% of public interest
law centers have income below $300,000).
Contributions from major charitable foundations have declined. See id. at 18 (Ford Foundation,
largest foundation contributor to public interest law, has reduced support, and Rockefeller Brothers
Fund, fourth largest contributor, has announced plans to phase out support); COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW, supra note 4, at 238-42 (describing decline in foundation support for public interest
law). Economic conditions, rather than weaknesses in the theoretical justification of public interest
practice, were undoubtedly the primary cause of this decline in financial support.
9. See pp. 1438-39 infra (describing criticism of public interest lawyers).
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legal system and argues that many of the apparently problematic aspects
of public interest practice should be understood as legitimate efforts to
reduce these inequalities.
I. Public Interest Law: Current Criticisms and Justifications
The activities of public interest lawyers are subject to increasing
criticism. Although current justifications provide a starting point for
understanding the role of the public interest lawyer, they do not explain
many of the most distinctive aspects of public interest practice. In order to
maintain a strong public interest law movement, public interest lawyers
must develop a new theoretical foundation for their work and, in
particular, for their techniques of representation.
A. Criticisms of Public Interest Practice
Public interest representation has been the subject of widespread
criticism, generally directed not at the goals of public interest lawyers, but
rather at the manner in which they pursue them."0 First, critics attack
public interest lawyers for taking action, allegedly on behalf of their
clients, when their clients may not even perceive either a legal or a
nonlegal problem and have not requested assistance." Public interest
lawyers have been accused of "cooking up" or provoking legal
controversies. 12 They have also repeatedly been attacked in the courts for
soliciting clients."
Second, critics allege that there are no mechanisms to ensure that public
interest lawyers' activities will benefit their clients and that, in fact, they
often do not do so. Public interest lawyers often define a group of
individuals, for example the poor people in a particular region, as their
10. Although a desire to frustrate public interest lawyers' pursuit of their goals may be the
underlying motive of many critics, c. Federal Program of Legal Aid Faces Conservative Challenge,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1980, § B, at 13, col. 3 (conservative organizations seek elimination of federal
legal services program), several of the most thoughtful critics have themselves been public interest
lawyers. Two former staff attorneys with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., have written articles
criticizing civil rights lawyers' litigation strategy. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Clark, The
Lawyer in the Civil Rights Movement-Catalytic Agent or Counter-Revolutionary? 19 KAN. L. REV.
459 (1971).
11. See, e.g., Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930, 931
(1972) (criticizing legal services attorneys for taking initiative in lawyer-client relationships).
12. See, Taylor, supra note 1, at 3, col. I (noting attacks on "activist lawyers" who "stir up
unnecessary trouble"). But c. Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1125 n.
91 (1970) (public interest lawyers do not want judges to think cases are "cooked up by a social
reformer attorney").
13. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (disciplinary action against ACLU-affiliated
attorney for referring woman required to- undergo sterilization as condition of receiving welfare
benefits to other ACLU attorneys); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (action against NAACP
for soliciting plaintiffs for school desegregation litigation).
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client group. Critics suggest that the interests of such a group are too
heterogeneous to be represented by a single organization of lawyers.'
Critics also argue that public interest lawyers ignore or even exploit the
fact that their clients often lack the resources and skills needed to express
their preferences or to voice their complaints effectively either individually
or as a group.'"
Public interest lawyers are ordinarily not financially dependent on their
clients'6 and the clients often cannot afford other forms of representation.
Thus market forces do not ensure that the lawyers provide legal assistance
that satisfies their clients.' 7 Some critics suggest that public interest
lawyers serve the interests of their financial supporters to the detriment of
their client group.'8 Other critics argue that they attempt to further their
own ideological convictions.' 9 Public interest lawyers have also been
accused of being principally concerned with receiving publicity" and
being unaware of or indifferent to their activities' actual impact on their
clients2 ' and on society.
22
14. See, e.g., Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV.
511, 522 (1969) (poor are not "monolithic or homogeneous group with its own democratically elected
representative structure"; representation is "necessarily ... imperfect..., artificial and imposed from
above"); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1765
(1975) (interests to be represented in large unorganized class of persons not readily identifiable and
may conflict); cf. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV.
487, 503 (1980) (organized bar's opposition to representation of groups of disadvantaged individuals
implicitly assumes people in groups are "isolated individualls] with personal interests which would be
betrayed by any effort to achieve power by joining with others").
15. Cf Cahn & Cahn, Power To the People or the Profession? -The Public Interest in Public
Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1036 (1970) (public interest lawyers have little respect for clients'
preferences because of race- and class-based condescension).
16. See D. CLOVIS & N. ARON, supra note 3, at 16 (public interest lawyers' activities almost
entirely financed by sources other than their clients).
17. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 15, at 1036 (public interest lawyers have monopoly of legal
services available to their clients).
18. See Bell, supra note 10, at 490 (civil rights lawyers' need to satisfy financial supporters affects
their choice of actions); Clark, supra note 10, at 469 (same). Financial supporters are more articulate,
better motivated, more easily identified, and fewer in number than members of the client groups. The
supporters may wish to further the best interests of the clients, but their conception may differ from
that of the clients. Middle-class blacks and whites, for whom school integration worked well, support
litigation to desegregate urban schools, although there are greater difficulties involved in integrating
inner-city schools and although lower-class blacks would prefer to improve the quality of their
schools. See Bell, supra note 10, at 489.
19. See, e.g., Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in
Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 336, 343 (1978) (public interest lawyers liable to
"subordinat[e] client interests to their own conceptions of the public or general good"); Cahn & Cahn,
supra note 15, at 1005-06, 1036, 1042-44 (public interest lawyers elevate own environmental concerns
over poverty-related issues).
20. See B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER, & N. KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 81-89 (public interest
lawyers may pursue publicity and contact with elites as substitutes for income); . LAWYERS, CLIENTS
& ETHICS 101 (M. Bloom ed. 1974) (class actions are popular form of litigation in legal aid clinics
partly because of "capacity to provide large sources of narcissistic gratification").
21. Cf Edmonds, Advocating Inequity: A Critique of the Civil Rights Attorney in Class Action
Desegregation Suits, 3 BLACK L.J. 176, 178-79 (1973) (only small minority of clients of civil rights
attorneys have access to attorneys); Note, supra note 12, at 1124-25 (public interest lawyers often
have little contact with members of classes, including named plaintiffs).
22. Public interest lawyers have been criticized for disregarding the adverse social and economic
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B. Current Justifications and Their Shortcomings
Current justifications of public interest law fail to address these criti-
cisms of the manner in which public interest lawyers represent clients;
they explain only the basis for selecting clients. Public interest lawyers
assert that their mission is to serve individuals and interests that have
traditionally been underrepresented in the legal system. 23 Some try to ad-
vance specific substantive goals, such as equality in the distribution of
wealth or protection of an abstract right to free expression.24 Others, par-
ticularly environmental lawyers, practice law on behalf of otherwise unor-
ganized groups with an interest in certain collective goods.215 Finally, some
public interest lawyers provide low-cost or free legal services to individu-
als who are too poor to obtain private legal assistance. 6
These current justifications are incomplete. They assert that legal needs
are not being met, but fail to recognize the complex nature of these
needS27 and the methods of representation that are required to meet them.
consequences of their activities. See, e.g., Oakes, Saving the Web of Life, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1979,
§ A, at 27, col. 5 (noting criticisms that environmental law groups tie up court system, interfere with
implementation of energy policy, and contribute to slow economic growth); c. Bellow & Kettleson,
The Mirror of Public Interest Ethics: Problems and Paradoxes, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 248
(1978) (public interest lawyers have special duty to restrict adverse, external effects of aggressive
advocacy). But indifference to the external costs of litigation is not peculiar to public interest lawyers.
See Oakes, supra (industries fighting environmental restrictions create at least as many external costs
as public interest lawyers).
23. See, e.g., D. CLOVIS & N. ARON, supra note 3, at I n.**; COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW, supra note 4, at 3.
24. See Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 207, 210-14 (1976) (ACLU's "ideological commitment" to protect privacy, political dissent, and
personal liberty); Note, supra note 12, at 1070 n:3 (many public interest lawyers committed to sub-
stantive objectives).
25. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 19, at 340 n.16 (some public interest lawyers seek to
advance collective preferences of consumers and environmentalists). Legal service is a collective good
when the benefits, spread across a group of people, exceed the cost, but no individual has a sufficient
stake in the controversy to obtain legal assistance on his own. Free-rider problems and the transaction
costs of organizing the affected group prevent the group from paying collectively for the desired legal
service. See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (general analysis of
collective goods). Several authors have attempted to fit all public interest practice into the collective
goods paradigm. See, e.g., J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 5-14 (1978).
26. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 4, at 7. Providing low-cost or free legal
services is the primary function of legal services lawyers. Although these lawyers are not ordinarily
considered public interest lawyers, some of them operate in essentially the same fashion as tradition-
ally defined public interest lawyers. See A. Polikoff, Support Center Study (Feb. 16, 1976) (unpub-
lished report in Legal Services Corporation library) (describing "back-up" centers funded by Legal
Services Corporation); cf Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the Legal
Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 734, 734-35 (1976) (legal services attorneys contro-
versial because do not simply respond to individual clients' demands). Legal services attorneys also
complement the work of traditionally defined public interest law groups, for example, by enforcing
legal rights established by public interest lawyers. This Note considers all legal services lawyers to be
public interest lawyers, but it is primarily concerned with their self-conscious attempts to serve the
poor as a class.
27. Mayhew criticizes the narrow use of the term "legal needs" in analyses of the distribution of
legal services, which enumerate "needs for legal services and opportunities for beneficial legal action
. . . as if they were so many diseases or injuries in need of treatment." He explains that
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In particular, they do not take account of the fact that legal problems exist
continuously during the life of any individual or group and hence require
continuous, active legal assistance. Nor do these analyses explore either
the obstacles that often prevent an individual from perceiving that she has
a legal problem for which she could use legal assistance, or the resulting
need for "solicitation" by public interest lawyers.2"
Public interest lawyers' failure to expand upon current justifications for
public interest practice and to address their critics may have weakened the
public interest movement. The following sections explore the complexity
of legal needs and the ways in which differential access to lawyers affects
individuals' ability to use the legal system. This analysis provides a more
complete justification for public interest practice and answers many of the
criticisms of public interest lawyers.
II. The Nature and Distribution of Legal Goods
This Note defines legal goods29 as those advantages created or defined
by legal rules and conferred through legal assistance. Legal goods include
judicial determinations in favor of an individual in a dispute with another,
as well as material benefits awarded by the government. People may also
obtain legal goods without formally becoming involved in the legal system,
for example, by learning to obtain something they desire without incur-
ring legal sanctions?0 Legal goods are complex; they are neither discrete
in time nor always perceivable by laymen. As a result, differential access
to lawyers creates significant inequalities in persons' ability to secure legal
goods.
A. The Complexity of Legal Goods
To obtain the maximum benefit from the system of legal goods, individ-
uals and organizations must be continuously aware of alternatives and
we have a vast array of disputes, disorders, vulnerabilities, and wrongs, which contain an
enormous potential for the generation of legal actions. Whether any given situation becomes
defined as a 'legal' problem, or even if so defined, makes its way to an attorney or other agency
for possible aid or redress, is a consequence of the social organization of the legal system and
the organization of the larger society ....
Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 401, 404
(1975).
28. Analysts either ignore the problem of perception entirely or do not take adequate account of it.
See, e.g., B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER, & N. KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 103 ("While not denying that
people do have such 'mistaken' demands as a result of incomplete information, in the market for both
collective goods and private goods, we shall attempt, nonetheless, to focus on actual demands.")
29. This Note uses the term "legal goods" instead of "legal needs" in order to avoid possible
confusion arising from other analysts' use of the latter term. Cf. note 27 supra (discussing criticisms of
previous use of term "legal needs").
30. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis.
L. REV. 30, 41.
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consequences and must be able to plan their actions over time in light of
their knowledge. A person who knows in advance the legal rules that ap-
ply to a particular situation can more easily avoid litigation, reduce the
costs of litigation, and prepare for litigation that will produce a benefit.
Even in the absence of judicial proceedings, perceptions of legal rules con-
stantly influence the behavior of individuals and organizations. For exam-
ple, a person's perception, whether accurate or not, that he may violate a
legal rule and possibly suffer sanctions may deter him from taking an
action that would advance his preferences.
Despite the importance of legal goods, individuals and organizations
often fail to perceive these goods. Obstacles to perception arise from the
great number and detail of legal rules, the frequent inconsistencies be-
tween legal rules and social norms, and laymen's lack of the critical per-
spective necessary to identify legal goods.
People may not perceive legal rules and thus may fail to obtain legal
goods simply because the body of potentially relevant law is so vast and
complex. Most laymen do not have time, resources, or incentives to learn
how to find legal rules or to develop skill in manipulating them." Al-
though most people are familiar with many broad legal principles, 2 lay-
men are unlikely to be familiar with all the detailed rules in any field. 3
Many of these rules are adopted to implement general principles, but they
cannot be deduced from knowledge of these principles alone. 4
In addition, people may sometimes fail to perceive violations of their
legal rights because some legal rules are neither based on nor consistent
with social norms.35 These rules may be autonomous intellectual con-
31. Cf B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 90-92 (1977) (laymen dis-
cover particular rules in ad hoc manner and lack time or inclination to learn how rules fit together). It
is not economically rational for most people to develop legal expertise in order to handle their per-
sonal legal problems. However, it is rational for specialists-lawyers-to acquire this knowledge and
skill. Cf id. at 93 (division of labor implies that lawyers view society differently than laymen view it).
32. Cf R. LANE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY (1962) (case studies of laymen's basic understanding of
central principles of society). But see Williams & Hall, Knowledge of the Law in Texas: Socioeco-
nomic and Ethnic Differences, 7 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 99, 113-14 (1972) (individuals surveyed cor-
rectly answered an average of only 12 to 19 out of 30 questions about basic legal rules).
33. For example, an individual may understand the general principles of contract that prevent a
landlord from withholding a security deposit unless the tenant damages the leasehold. But a tenant
may not know that his landlord must return his deposit with interest and within a certain time period
after termination of the tenancy or that if the landlord withholds part of the deposit he must give the
tenant a written statement itemizing the damages. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-21(d), (West
Supp. 1981).
34. For example, a subrule may reflect a political compromise involving nonlegal considerations
or an arbitrary choice among several reasonable alternatives.
35. This Note uses the term "social norm" to mean a generally accepted practice or pattern of
expectations. Obviously, social norms are not always sharply defined nor are they uniform across
social groups and settings. See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704, 723 n.45 (1931) ("habit, or custom, or folk way, or practice, or institution is not a line-
concept, but a belt concept, with an important range of variation").
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structs, formed using theoretical principles, analytic techniques, and data
that are not accessible to many laymen. 6 As a result, laymen cannot easily
predict either the exact content of such rules or how they ought to be
applied. Laymen's knowledge of law may also be hindered by the applica-
tion of legal rules that have been developed in and thus reflect the norms
of one social setting, for example prisons, to other situations in which the
norms are different, such as mental hospitals. 7
There is, of course, interaction between legal rules and social norms.
When legal rules protect people in some manner or entitle them to some
benefit, expectations are created and made legitimate. 8 In addition, par-
ticularly in criminal law, 9 social norms are sometimes adopted directly as
legal rules and often indirectly influence the development and interpreta-
tion of legal rules. ° Once a social norm enters the legal system or a legal
rule creates a social norm, however, the norm and rule begin to diverge.4 '
36. For example, starting from utilitarian first principles, lawmakers might systematically analyze
the economic effects of applying different tort liability rules and adopt the rule that produces the
optimal allocation of resources. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Ackerman de-
scribes this type of reasoning as "scientific policymaking." See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 10-20.
According to Ackerman, a scientific policymaker analyzes social situations using "categories that do
not depend for their validity on their connection with the language used in everyday life." Id. at 194
n.15. This type of legal reasoning is "esoteric" and does not merely reflect "existing social practices."
Id. at 177. Although Ackerman admits that lawyers employ several modes of thought, id. at 110, he
argues that use of scientific policymaking is increasing. Id. at 114, 185.
The analytic techniques used to generate autonomous legal rules may not be self-consciously
adopted by law makers; instead, they may reflect professional habits of thought shaped by the
processes of lawmaking or the common background, needs, and interests of lawmakers. See Isaacs,
How Lawyers Think, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 558 (1923); Llewellyn, supra note 35, at 720 n.43.
Lawyers' common interest in maintaining the status and independence of their profession may explain
why they cultivate autonomous legal rules. See id. at 719 n.40; Tushnet, Perspectives on the Develop-
ment of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's 'A History of American Law', 1977 WIS. L.
REV. 81, 88-91.
37. See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds,
422 U.S. 563 (1975) (grounding mental patients' right to treatment on comparison of confinement of
prisoners and mental patients). Public interest lawyers have actively sought to expand the rights of
mental patients using law developed in the prison context. See MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT,
BASIC RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 115-18 (1973) (describing Donaldson litigation and
similar cases).
38. See Denvir, supra note 6, at 1143; Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an
Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1974) (growing "penetration" of law increases its impor-
tance as socializing force).
39. In criminal law, in which the sanctions that flow from a finding of wrongdoing tend to be
most severe, courts explicitly attempt to prevent legal rules and social norms from diverging. See, e.g.,
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (unconstitutional to punish convicted felons for not
registering upon entering state because such action does not violate community norms).
40. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 88-112 (defining "ordinary observation" as lawmaking
that derives legal rules from dominant social practices); Bohannan, Law and Legal Institutions, in 9
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 75 (D. Shils ed. 1968) (law results from
"double institutionalization" of custom).
41. In the words of Karl Llewellyn:
Law must grow fixed, in most of its parts, and relative to most of the ways of society apart
from law. . . . [Tihe legal obligation ceases to function merely as an extra insurance that
engagements will be performed. . . . [and] comes to function also as a source of risk. If the
other party appeals to law, then to the extent that the obligation is viewed by layman and by
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A third reason that individuals cannot always recognize legal goods is
that they lack the necessary critical perspective. Perception of legal goods
requires an act of evaluation. Judges evaluate situations from a disen-
gaged and comparative position, and many lawyers approximate that
stance, functioning as critical legal observers. 42 By contrast, most people
have limited resources and pressing needs that prevent them from evaluat-
ing their situations carefully. 43 Furthermore, limited experience outside
their own social situations limits individuals' abilities to compare their sit-
uation to others' situations and may limit their ability to apply abstract
legal standards to their own experiences. 4' As a result, laymen often fail to
abstract from and organize their experiences in a way that allows them to
perceive legal goods.45
B. The Distribution of Legal Goods
The complexity of legal goods affects persons' ability to exploit the legal
system. Because unassisted laymen have a limited ability to perceive legal
goods, differences in access to legal assistance create significant differences
in individuals' and organizations' relations to the legal system.41
1. Organizations and Individuals With Continuous Access to
Legal Assistance
law-man differently, I shall either get less, or be held to more, than the customary understand-
ing calls for. . . . [Sluch a divergence, such an incursion of risk, is a constant tendency as soon
as legal technique becomes specialized, as soon as officials begin looking for their solutions not
directly at the life before them, but indirectly at the deposits of their own or their predecessors'
prior dealings with similar situations.
Llewellyn, supra note 35, at 713-14.
42. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 141 (1978) (corporation's general
counsel "routinely reviews all major transactions").
43. Cf. P. FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 48, 94, 100 (1970) (oppressed people fail to
take revolutionary action because of difficulty of engaging in critical thinking about their situation).
44. See L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 164 (1968) (system based on individual
discrimination complaints "predicate[s] law enforcement on the limited experiences and selective per-
spectives of a segmented and isolated population"); Carlin, Howard, & Messinger, Civil Justice and
the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9, 74-75 (1966) ("comparatively
'narrow world' " of poor people limits their ability "to objectify events and experiences and to deal
with abstract issues"); cf P. FREIRE, supra note 43, at 48, 94 ("Submerged in reality, the oppressed
cannot perceive clearly the 'order' which serves the interests of the oppressors whose image they have
internalized.") Moreover, personal experience alone may not produce enough data to reveal some
legal violations; for example, violations of antidiscrimination or antitrust laws. Evidence of violations
of such laws must be actively sought. Mayhew found that community and civil rights organizations
bring stronger discrimination complaints than individuals because their complaints are based not on
one individual's experience, but on a comparison of many persons' experiences. See L. MAYHEW,
supra, at 179-80, 189.
45. See L. MAYHIEW, supra note 44, at 197 (concluding from study of complaints filed with Mas-
sachussetts Commission Against Discrimination that "personal experience is too difficult to interpret
to provide an adequate indicator of the presence or absence of discrimination").
46. The following typology of actors is borrowed in large measure from Galanter, Why the




It is both feasible and rational for people and organizations to establish
ongoing relationships with lawyers when two conditions are satisfied.
First, because legal assistance is expensive, the individual or group must
be wealthy. Second, the potential benefits from continuous legal assistance
must exceed the costs. The person or entity must encounter either highly
repetitive legal goods or high-stakes legal goods that can be identified in
advance or whose timing can be controlled. A large corporation is the
paradigmatic example of this type of client.4 7 Repetitive legal transactions,
retail sales for example, lead to economies of scale in the acquisition of
ongoing legal advice.48  Predictable or controllable large-scale legal
problems, such as tax payments or intercorporate contracts, justify hiring
lawyers to help plan and execute the corporation's business over an ex-
tended period.
Individuals and organizations with continuing access to lawyers obtain
more legal assistance 49 and a qualitatively different type of legal assistance
than others receive. Instead of seeking discrete pieces of advice or short-
term representation in individual proceedings, they generally purchase as-
sistance in bulk by having lawyers in-house or on retainer.5 0 These law-
yers engage in long-range, comprehensive legal planning. Their perspec-
tive influences the formation of the clients' initial aspirations. Ongoing
legal counsel also identify legal benefits for their clients."' They follow the
development of the law 2 and think about new ways in which it can be
47. Because corporations are organizations, already structured to collect information from many
sources, it is easier for them to integrate lawyers into their decision-making processes. In addition,
lawyers' participation in corporate decision processes does not involve the same loss of personal auton-
omy and intrusion into private life as does providing the same type of assistance to individuals. Cf
Galanter, supra note 46, at 106 n.23 (organizations are less averse to litigation than individuals be-
cause members of organization who have contact with opposing party can be insulated from litigation
by division of labor).
48. Compare Galanter, supra note 46, at 98 (routine litigation creates economies of scale) with
Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession, 1 LAW & POL'Y Q. 5, 15-17 (1979) (when people encounter
many dissimilar legal goods involving small stakes, such as those arising from consumer transactions,
and sporadic, unpredictable legal goods involving high stakes, such as personal injury claims, cost of
continuous assistance is likely to exceed benefits).
49. See P. STERN, LAWYERS ON TRIAL 25 (1980) (in one year A.T. & T. spent $26 million on
legal assistance while United States government spent $11 million for legal assistance for two million
poor people in New York State).
50. See J. DONNELL, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL 30 (1970) (in 1967, 61% of all business corpora-
tions and 91% of corporations with more than 25,000 employees had full-time legal staffs); Galanter,
supra note 46, at 114 (repeat players buy services in "larger quantities" and "in bulk"); Legal Costs
Spur In-House Staffing, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1980, § D, at 1, col. 4 (in 1979, 50 corporations had at
least 50 attorneys in-house; A.T. & T. had largest staff with 902 lawyers, followed by Exxon with
384, and General Electric with 302).
51. Cf Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 765 (1964) (one danger of increasing
amount of "government largesse" is that groups with expertise acquire more largesse than others).
52. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 229 (1967) (Prudential In-
surance Co. lawyers screen every bill introduced in national and state legislatures). Businesses in
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applied. Finally, they help their clients identify and select among alterna-
tive courses of action and act as their agents in a wide range of situations
outside the courtroom. 3 In this highly interactive relationship, 4 the client
and the lawyer act in tandem to identify legal goods.
Some groups with continuing access to lawyers, large corporations for
example, may receive more legal assistance because they confront more
legal rules than most individuals." Nevertheless, the qualitatively differ-
ent type of assistance they receive gives them an advantage over people
without ongoing assistance in the exploitation of all types of legal goods.56
They have a more accurate understanding of which actions will result in
legal penalties and can therefore plan their behavior to minimize the re-
straining force of the rules and the possibility of incurring sanctions. 7
These clients make more innovative demands on the legal system. Upon
advice of counsel, they can alter their behavior when it is necessary to
exploit particular legal benefits and protections. 8 In short, individuals and
effect subsidize the publication of looseleaf services and newsletters upon which their lawyers rely to
remain knowledgable about law affecting business. Few individual clients can afford such expensive
legal services.
53. See G. HAZARD, supra note 42, at 141-42 (describing "intimate" relationship between general
counsel and corporate client); Dodge, Evolution of a City Law Office: Office Flow of Business (pt. 2),
1956 Wis. L. REV. 35, 48 (in 1950, firm primarily representing business organizations spent 59.7% of
its time counseling, 31.6% negotiating, 0.6% involved with the clients' organizations, and only 8.1%
litigating).
54. Even if a formal, ongoing lawyer-client relationship has not been established, actors who re-
peatedly obtain legal assistance have more interactive relationships with their lawyers than people
who receive legal assistance only occasionally. Lawyers tend to be familiar with the types of legal
problems encountered by those who repeatedly obtain legal assistance. In addition, lawyers may ethi-
cally solicit former clients if the "advice is germane to the former employment." ABA MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-104(A)(1) (1980) [Disciplinary Rules here-
inafter cited as DR without cross-reference]. Finally, individuals who can afford to hire lawyers fre-
quently are more likely to interact with lawyers on a social basis. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 116-17 (1975) (solicitation occurs in social settings).
55. Large corporations are subject to comprehensive regulatory programs because they engage in
various activities with significant and widespread effects. In addition, legal rules applicable to corpora-
tions have become more complex in response to the efforts of corporate counsel to enable their clients
to avoid legal obligations. Finally, corporations' innovative demands on the legal system generate more
legal rules.
56. See Galanter, supra note 46, at 98-103 (organizations repeatedly involved in litigation acquire
litigation skills and resources and use individual cases to create legal rules that will favor them in later
cases). The advantageous position of individuals who obtain continuous legal assistance is analogous to
those who receive preventive medical care. A doctor can identify disease at an earlier stage than the
patient and can recognize diseases, such as a heart murmur, that the patient himself may not be able
to detect. Thus, he can help his patients avoid illness and recover more easily when they become ill.
By revealing that certain conditions are remediable, the doctor may also influence a patient's concepts
of illness and health.
57. See G. HAZARD, supra note 42, at 2-3. But c. Abel, supra note 48, at 21 (equalizing legal
knowledge may have little impact on actors' differing abilities to use law strategically because larger,
wealthier actors can still dictate terms of legal relationship with other actors).
58. See, e.g., E. SNIIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 6-7 (1969) (lawyers instrumental in alter-
ing corporate financing and control practices in order to take advantage of legal rules); P. STERN,
supra note 49, at 145 (lawyers advise corporations to set up dummy "branches" in other nations to
exploit tax regulations and other rules); Shuchman, The Fraud Exception in Consumer Bankruptcy,
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organizations with ongoing legal assistance adopt an instrumental attitude,
evaluating legal rules as potential liabilities and resources.5 9
2. Organizations and Individuals Without Continuous Assistance
By contrast, people who lack continuing legal assistance cannot as effec-
tively pursue their interests within legal bounds or use the legal system to
advance their preferences. A misperception about a legal rule or the likeli-
hood of its enforcement may deter them from taking an action that would
not in fact result in sanctions. Alternatively, persons may engage in activ-
ity that exposes them to liability that they could have avoided had they
been aware of legal rules.
60
Perhaps most significantly, individuals who lack continuous legal assis-
tance do not perceive many opportunities to use the legal system actively
to advance their preferences. 6' The litigation they initiate and their other
demands for legal benefits are systematically limited in several respects.
First, they primarily exploit traditional legal remedies.62 Many of these
23 STAN. L. REV. 735, 761-62 (1971) (creditors adjust practices in order to utilize fraud exception to
prevent consumers from discharging debts under bankruptcy law).
59. L. MAYHEW, supra note 44, at 27-74 (individuals, unlike organizations, do not "consciousily]
utiliz[e] ... law as an instrument"); see Simon, supra note 30, at 85 (individuals with legal assistance
and experience do not conceive of rules as "ends or imperatives, but rather as facts and tools for the
manipulation of society to serve" own purposes); Galanter, supra note 46, at 98 (unlike "players"
who litigate sporadically, those who litigate repeatedly "manage" their legal claims "routinely and
rationally").
60. See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 155 (1963) (many consumers not aware of "set of
legal conditions embodied in the contracts they sign" or potential penalties until they violate condi-
tion). Individuals, particularly the poor, ordinarily lack ongoing legal assistance, see p. 1445 supra
(describing preconditions for obtaining ongoing assistance), and are defendants more often than are
organizations. See Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations: Initiating Civil Cases in Urban
Trial Courts (pt. 1), 8 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 421, 423-25, 431-32 (1974) (individuals are defendants in
two-thirds, but initiate only two-fifths, of civil cases) [hereinafter cited as Wanner, Initiating Cases];
Yngvesson & Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Litera-
ture, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 219, 236 (1975). In 12 out of 14 small claims courts studied, individuals
were found to be defendants in 78% of cases or more, and plaintiffs in 42% or less). Individuals are
also more often unsuccessful as defendants than organizations. See Wanner, The Public Ordering of
Private Relations: Winning Civil Court Cases (pt. 2), 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 293, 302 (1975).
61. See Sykes, Legal Needs of the Poor in the City of Denver, 4 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 255, 262-63
(1969) (lawyers found that of 232 individuals who indicated they had no legal problems, 120 actually
had a legal need).
Individuals are plaintiffs in significantly fewer cases than organizations, particularly corporations.
See Wanner, Initiating Cases, supra note 60, at 423-25 (individuals initiated 41.7% and organizations
49.16% of litigation in sample); Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 60, at 235-36 (in only 2 of 14
small claims courts studied were more than 42% of cases brought by nonbusiness plaintiffs; in 7, less
than 17% of cases were brought by such plaintiffs).
62. See F. MARKS, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 8 (1971) ("The poor
are traditionalists in their conception of the legal system-in their identification of legal problems,
legal need, and in the registration of demands upon the formal system."); Levine & Preston, Commu-
nity Resource Orientation Among Low Income Groups, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 80, 90 (low-income per-
sons most likely to seek legal assistance when confronted with situations in which lawyers tradition-
ally utilized, e.g., writing will, paying income taxes, purchasing real estate); Marks, A Lawyer's Duty
to Take All Comers and Many Who Do Not Come, 30 U. MIAI L. REV. 915, 918-20 (1976) (many
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remedies are purely formal, 3 for example, an uncontested divorce." Al-
though a legal proceeding is necessary in this type of case, it will seldom
significantly influence existing conditions. In general, until a legal remedy
has been established and its implications articulated through repeated ap-
plication, unassisted individuals seldom perceive that the remedy is availa-
ble.6 Prior to the articulation of a legal remedy, people may have no more
than a diffuse feeling of discontent about a potentially remediable
situation.6
Second, because people without continuing legal assistance do not use
legal rules to evaluate their experiences critically and do not alter their
expectations in light of legal rules, they usually resort to the legal system
only after they experience a breach of social n6rms.67 These deviations
from social norms tend to be discrete, adverse changes or events, such as
the breakdown of social relationships.6 1 Static conditions seldom provoke
individuals, poor in particular, fail to recognize that use of legal system is possible if legal remedy not
already established).
63. See Galanter, supra note 46, at 108 (individuals often engage in nonadversarial, formal adju-
dications--"pseudo-litigation"); Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as
a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244, 253 (1968) (individuals seek legal assistance
when law requires, but do not benefit significantly from it).
64. Divorce actions are a large component of the litigation initiated by individuals, particularly
poor individuals. See Mayhew, supra note 27, at 403 (40% of individuals seeking legal aid desire
assistance with domestic difficulty); White, Lawyers and the Enforcement of Rights, in SOCIAL NEEDS
AND LEGAL ACTION 21 (P. Morris, R. White, & P. Lewis eds. 1973) (in England, over 70% of those
granted legal aid seek matrimonial proceeding). Since an overwhelming proportion of divorces are
uncontested, see Galanter, supra note 46, at 108, divorce actions have little impact on the actual
interpersonal relationships of the parties and may not even have significant collateral implications. See
Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE
L.J. 104, 129-37 (1976) (divorce decrees seldom affect ancillary issues, e.g., property division and
support obligations).
Another example of formal use of the legal system is the registration of deeds after sales of prop-
erty. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §47-10 (West Supp. 1980) (recording of conveyance of land
required).
65. Emphasis on traditional legal remedies slows the development of legal rules that might benefit
people who lack ongoing legal assistance. See Abel, supra note 48, at 17, 30 (noting "cycle of mutu-
ally reinforcing ignorance," in which potential clients do not perceive problems as legal and lawyers
lack incentive to acquire and convey information to change perception, causes inadequate development
of favorable law); Morris, A Sociological Approach to Legal Services, in SOCIAL NEEDS AND LEGAL
A(TION 54 (P. Morris, R. White, & P. Lewis eds. 1973) (describing same "vicious circle").
66. This is also a problem in the political process. See Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist
Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 14 (W. Connolly ed. 1969) (some segments of society lack per-
spective or level of awareness to locate "structural causes of their vague feelings of anxiety, malaise,
frustration, and resentment," which are therefore not "stated as clear-cut grievances [or)... organized
as public issues"); cf. L. PEATTIE, THE VIEW FROM THE BARRIO 85-90 (1968) ("People shape their
demands in terms of what is seen as possible.")
67. See F. MARKS, supra note 62, at 6-7 ("where community response was either unclear or in
flux, the poor showed a predisposition not to see a legal dimension to problems"; thus, because legal
right to welfare not backed by social norm, only 16.3% of sample would seek legal assistance if denied
benefits); Marks, supra note 62, at 9 (poor did not recognize legal remedy if broad community sup-
port for their position or internalization of legal rules was lacking).
68. Mayhew, in his study of discrimination complaints, found that "ft]he vast majority of disputes
that arise within a system of private law do not challenge the social order." L. MAYHEW, supra note
44, at 273. Instead, "[litigants seek redress for grievances that arise through misunderstandings, di-
1448
Public Interest Practice
affirmative legal demands.6 9
Third, individuals without ongoing legal counsel seldom consider the
legal context in selecting a course of action. 0 Yet sometimes one must
alter his behavior in order to be in a position to invoke a legal rule." For
example, a black carpenter must stop working for contractors and submit
his own bids for projects in order to benefit from rules designed to channel
public funding to minority contractors.72 A black worker, in order to take
advantage of antidiscrimination laws, may have to apply for a different
type of job than he currently has or would ordinarily seek. However, legal
rules rarely motivate unassisted individuals to alter traditional patterns of
action."
III. The Role of Public Interest Lawyers
In order to represent their client groups effectively, public interest law-
yers must try to provide the same type of continuous assistance that corpo-
rate counsel provide to their clients. The activities of public interest law-
yers that appear the most problematic and generate the most criticism can
be understood as efforts to achieve this ideal.
vergent interpretations of situations and other points of friction." Id. In his study, he found that 20.3%
of employment discrimination complaints concerned discharge, 57.6% refusal to hire, and only 5.1%
involved promotion; housing complaints almost exclusively concerned unsuccessful attempts to move
and none related to exorbitant rent, bad sanitation, or ill repair. Id. at 160, 164, 165. See Galanter,
supra note 46, at 108, 110 (rupture of ongoing relations provokes litigation); Summers, Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 239, 252 (1960) (over
three-fourths of cases in which workers asserted rights under collective bargaining agreements arose
out of disciplinary discharge).
69. This Note's description of the conditions under which people who lack continuous legal assis-
tance invoke the legal system is similar to Fiss' distinction between "dispute-resolution" and "struc-
tural reform" litigation. See Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979). The former
involves disputes within a set of socially accepted norms. The latter involves using relatively autono-
mous values embedded in the legal system to attack institutions or norms that perpetuate deviations
from these values. Id.
70. See Shuchman, supra note 63, at 253-54 (lawyers who represent small clients seldom counsel
"in any meaningful sense" because clients usually come to them only to gain their official approval or
after an unexpected, adverse event when "the game is already made").
71. Cf note 58 supra (corporate counsel advise their clients to alter their behavior to take advan-
tage of legal opportunities).
72. E.g., 41 C.F.R. § 24-1.715 (1980) (Department of Housing and Urban Development policy
of encouraging minority businesses to compete for contracts).
73. This is confirmed by the results of Mayhew's study of complaints filed with the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination. See L. MAYHEW, supra note 44. Mayhew found that individual
blacks challenged employers with above-average proportions of black workers much more often than
employers with below-average numbers. Civil rights and community groups, unlike individuals, con-
centrated on "strategic targets"-employers and neighborhoods with below-average proportions of
blacks. Id. at 171-74. He concluded that individuals did not use the law in a "purposive, directed, and
systematic" manner to attack "influential" and "historically exclusive" targets; the "structure of en-
forcement" was therefore tied to "the structure of the Negro community and its established patterns of
participation in the economy." Id. at 273-74.
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A. Redefining the Tasks of Public Interest Lawyers
The preceding analysis indicates the need for a public interest lawyer to
adopt several strategies in order to provide effective legal assistance to her
client group. First, she must initiate contact with and offer her assistance
to members of the client group. Within the continuous relationship be-
tween corporate counsel and their clients, such solicitation occurs regu-
larly.14 Similarly, public interest lawyers often engage in solicitation by
contacting their parent organizations or other organizations that they re-
peatedly represent.75 In addition, public interest lawyers must actively of-
fer assistance to individuals within the client group. Although the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits
solicitation unless the lawyer has a special relationship with the prospec-
tive client,76 the Supreme Court recognized in In re Primus that public
interest lawyers' effectiveness often depends on their ability to solicit indi-
vidual clients.77 The Court held that the First Amendment protected the
right of an American Civil Liberties Union attorney to advise an individ-
ual of her legal rights and to refer her, by letter, to other attorneys affili-
ated with the ACLU. 8
74. See pp. 1445-46 supra (describing interactive relationship between corporate counsel and cli-
ent). The Code of Professional Responsibility does not prohibit counsel from soliciting a former client
if the advice is germane to the former employment. See DR 2-104(A)(1). The ABA recently reaf-
firmed that "[i]t certainly is not improper for a lawyer to advise his regular clients of new statutes,
court decisions, and administrative rulings which may affect the client's interests," and indeed it
"might even be his duty." ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE
2-104(A)(1) at 17 n.82 (1980) (citing two 1941 opinions). Thus, corporations and wealthy individuals
may be solicited because they have ongoing counsel or are "regular clients" of specific lawyers. More-
over, because these clients interact informally with lawyers, unethical solicitation is more difficult to
detect. In contrast, solicitation of an individual with whom a lawyer does not have an established
relationship is generally proscribed by the ethical rules. See DR 2-103. This double standard has been
severely criticized. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, supra note 54, at 116-17; Shuchman, supra note 63, at
255-57.
75. See J. HANDLER, supra note 25, at 31 (lawyers perceive problem and contact leaders of orga-
nizations they have previously represented). Public interest lawyers' relationships with organizations
they frequently represent resemble the formal ongoing relationships established between corporate
attorneys and their clients. See Rabin, supra note 24, at 234-35.
76. See DR 2-103(A), -104 (solicitation barred except when person solicited is lawyer's friend,
relative, or former client).
77. 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978).
78. Id. at 439. However, the Court did not make clear whether the type of organization involved
or the lawyer's actual motive in soliciting the client was critical to the result, nor did it specify what
types of organizations or motives are constitutionally protected. Id. at 422-31, 434-39. The discussion
draft of the proposed ABA rules of professional ethics allows solicitation "under the auspices of a
public or charitable legal services organization or a bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, em-
ployee, or trade organization whose purposes include but are not limited to providing or recom-
mending legal services." ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9.3(b)(3) (discussion draft Jan. 30, 1980). Although the
definition of groups that may solicit is ambiguous, most public interest lawyers would be permitted to
solicit under this rule.
The Court did not hold that all forms of solicitation are protected. See 436 U.S. at 438-39 (state is
free to fashion "reasonable" restrictions with respect to time, place, and manner of solicitation and to
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Second, the public interest lawyer should maintain continuous contact
with her clients in order to learn of their most important needs for legal
services." Without such a continuing relationship, the public interest law-
yer's ability to provide assistance would depend upon her clients' limited
understanding of legal goods and on her own haphazard social contacts
with the client group."0
Third, the public interest lawyer should adopt an instrumental attitude
in representing her clients. She should discover their aspirations and dis-
satisfactions and determine whether and how legal assistance could ad-
vance their interests. For example, an attorney might find that poor peo-
ple cannot obtain medical care at a local hospital. Although the poor are
likely to perceive this as a problem, they are not likely to perceive it as a
legal problem. The lawyer should evaluate the situation, investigate its
legal implications, and think creatively about legal actions that might force
the hospital to serve the poor.8
The fourth desirable characteristic of the public interest lawyer's role is
a critical perspective. She cannot serve her clients well if she simply re-
sponds to their perceived needs. She uses her skills to analyze her clients'
situations in light of abstract legal doctrine and to compare them to simi-
lar settings in which legal rules have been utilized . 2 As a result of her
critical evaluation of her clients' needs, the public interest lawyer stimu-
prohibit solicitation that is "misleading, overbearing or involves other features of deception or im-
proper influence"); cf ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9.3(a) (discussion draft Jan. 30, 1980) (lawyer may not
initiate contact with "prospective client" if the lawyer "should know that the physical, emotional, or
mental state" of the client prevents that person from "exercisfing] reasonable judgement," or if pro-
spective client has made known "desire not to receive communications," or if contact would involve
"coercion, duress, or harassment").
79. In contrast to the private bar, public interest lawyers currently provide little ongoing counsel-
ing to their clients. See J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH, & H. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE
PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 79-80 (1978) (73.8% of public interest lawyers' activity is litigation; an-
other 9.4% involves administrative complaints or petitions).
Neighborhood legal services offices represent an attempt to create a more continuous public interest
lawyer-client relationship. See Matthews & Weiss, What Can be Done: A Neighborhood Lawyer's
Credo, 47 B.U. L. REV. 231, 238-39 (1967) (neighborhood lawyer more than "ad hoc advocate or
emergency advisor"); c pp. 1456-57 infra (decentralization increases accountability of public interest
lawyers).
80. Cf Lochner, The No Fee and Low Fee Legal Practice of Private Attorneys, 9 LAW & SOc'Y
REV. 431, 434-42, 448-55 (1975) (private lawyers receive pro bono work through network of social
ties; socially isolated individuals receive little pro bono assistance).
81. For examples of this type of instrumental public interest lawyering, see B. WEISBROD, J.
HANDLER, & N. KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 371 (National Health and Environmental Law Project
investigated health care problems of poor, identified statute requiring federally supported hospitals to
provide reasonable amount of free care to poor, and brought suit in several states under statute);
Lubenow, The Action Lawyers, SATURDAY REV., Aug. 26, 1972, at 36, 37-39 (lawyers at Western
Center For Law and Poverty became aware of low-income families' concern about poor quality of
neighborhood schools, consulted with academic lawyers, and initiated litigation based on equal protec-
tion doctrines that led to invalidation of California's system of school financing).
82. Cf C. MCCARRY, CITIZEN NADER 182 (1972) (Nader observes aspects of society and relies on
own sense of injustice to stimulate action).
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lates demands among her clients and shapes their nonlegal demands into
legally cognizable claims,83 just as lawyers for wealthy individuals and
corporations help them develop preferences and expectations.
For example, black workers may not feel injured if they are not pro-
moted under a seemingly race-neutral seniority system. But if the system
does not satisfy the legal definition of a "bona fide seniority system," it
illegally perpetuates past discrimination." Public interest lawyers at-
tempting to provide continuing assistance to the group of black workers
would reveal this illegality to their clients, even though the clients would
not otherwise feel aggrieved. In this sense, the public interest lawyer pro-
vokes legal controversies.
Finally, public interest lawyers should seek to educate their clients
about the law. Whereas corporate counsel can personally advise their cli-
ents, public interest lawyers cannot serve all the individuals in their client
group directly. The clients are generally numerous and unorganized, and
often seek noncollective goods. Public interest lawyers must therefore use
more indirect means. For example, they often initiate nontraditional types
of litigation" and gain media attention in order to create awareness of
new rights and to alter the social expectations of the client group.8" This
strategy frequently stimulates private enforcement of new rights. 7 Public
interest attorneys can also advise their clients on a group basis.88 For ex-
ample, public interest lawyers distribute pamphlets that inform members
of the client group of their rights and help them plan basic legal transac-
tions. They also distribute standardized legal forms, such as leases, that
protect their clients' interests.89
83. Stimulating demands is not the same as falsifying clients' preferences. Cf. M. DUVERGER,
POLITICAL PARTIES 378, 380 (1954) (formation of opinion necessarily modifies raw, instinctive opin-
ion but strengthens it and enables it to be expressed); cf. p. 1448 supra (articulation of legal remedies
helps focus individuals' aspirations and dissatisfactions).
84. This example is based on the case of Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421 (9th
Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
85. See, e.g., Harrison & Jaffe, Public Interest Law Firms: New Voices for New Constituencies,
58 A.B.A.L.J. 459, 466 (1972) (Center for Law and Social Policy shifted litigation to urban issues
and away from environment after environmental law principles well established).
86. See Mayhew, supra note 27, at 420 ("Through the process of specification, that is by af-
firming new rights through the manipulation of the symbols of normative order, the creative lawyer
generates large classes of aggrieved parties."); c. p. 1443 supra (courts' decisions shape beliefs and
expectations).
87. See Mayhew, supra note 27, at 422 (public interest, "proactive" litigation is precondition for
effective representation of presently unrepresented groups by private lawyers in new areas).
88. See, e.g., P. STERN, supra note 49, at 21 (Albert Kramer of Citizens' Communication Center
taught local citizens' groups how to monitor broadcasts, question station managers, and inspect station
files in light of federal regulations); Tapp & Levine, supra note 38, at 66-67 (Rhode Island Legal
Services attorneys taught inner-city high school students about consumer, housing, environmental,
juvenile, and criminal law; lawyers from Center for Study of Student Citizenship Rights and Respon-
sibilities taught poor, inner-city families about rights in relation to schools).
89. See, e.g., F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 301, 316 (1971) (during 1960s
legal services lawyers distributed manuals concerning rights to welfare, bail bonds, hospital care, ur-
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This analysis provides a response to critics who argue that it is im-
proper for public interest lawyers to represent individuals who have not
initiated the lawyer-client relationship and do not initially even perceive a
legal or nonlegal problem.90 Because of the complex nature of legal needs,
a client's autonomous perception and definition of a problem and unsolic-
ited request for legal assistance are not necessary preconditions for benefi-
cial legal representation. Rather, solicitation of individual clients and the
active creation of legal controversies are useful tools in public interest law-
yers' efforts to serve their clients.
B. The Accountability Problem
Although this more complete explanation of the public interest lawyer's
role effectively answers the criticism that public interest lawyers solicit
clients and provoke controversies, it does not respond directly to the argu-
ment that there are no mechanisms to ensure that public interest lawyers'
activities will actually benefit their clients.9 To the extent that public in-
terest lawyers reach out for clients and controversies, accountability con-
cerns become correspondingly more serious.9 Although the analysis in this
Note does not solve the accountability problem," it does provide a new
framework for viewing it. First, it reveals that the problem is not unique
to the relationship between the public interest lawyer and her client
group. Second, the analysis suggests that several of the factors that in-
crease the accountability of corporate lawyers can be replicated in the
public interest context.
ban renewal relocation subsidies, public housing, bankruptcy proceedings, and other subjects); Tapp
& Levine, supra note 38, at 67 (Center for Study of Student Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities
distributed primer on students' rights).
90. See p. 1438 supra (discussing criticism of public interest lawyers for soliciting clients and
provoking legal controversies).
91. See pp. 1439 supra (discussing criticism of public interest lawyers because of lack of
accountability).
92. Accountability is most problematic when public interest lawyers represent a class or an indi-
vidual plaintiff who wishes to further a group's interests. An individual's interest in maximizing his
gain in a specific controversy may conflict with the group interest. For example, an individual may
wish to settle a case that might produce law reform favorable to the group. See Galanter, supra note
46, at 100-03 (describing inability of unorganized groups to advance their long-term interests effec-
tively through individual members' self-interested litigation); c. Simon, supra note 14, at 503 (argu-
ing that overemphasis on value and uniqueness of individual lawyer-client relationship has prevented
lawyers from effectively serving poor as class).
Accountability is less problematic when public interest lawyers simply represent individual mem-
bers of client groups in situations in which the interests of the group as a whole are not implicated.
But see pp. 1439 supra (financial independence and clients' lack of sophistication give lawyers broad
discretion). Some public interest lawyers may operate both in the individualistic mode, as in divorce
actions, and in the collective mode, as in welfare rights litigation.
93. Problems of accountability might be dismissed as risks which must be taken in order to allow
public interest lawyers to serve their clients adequately. See Simon, supra note 14, at 504 (NAACP's
continuous and active representation of blacks is most effective way for victims of segregation to pur-
sue their ends, and "risk of betrayal," if any, was price individuals had to pay to take effective action).
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1. The Pervasiveness of the Accountability Problem
Corporate counsel are the paradigmatic example of attorneys who pro-
vide continuing legal assistance to clients. Despite the differences between
public interest and corporate lawyers, the accountability of both to their
client groups is problematic for several reasons. Corporations utilize sev-
eral mechanisms to counteract accountability problems, but they are only
partially successful.
First, although a corporation is highly organized and is presumed to
pursue a relatively narrow range of goals, it comprises many individuals
who often have divergent interests."4 Different representatives of the cor-
poration may give different interpretations of the corporation's interests.
As a result, corporate lawyers may have difficulty determining how to
represent their clients.9"
Second, because lawyers have specialized skills, it is difficult for corpo-
rate officers to evaluate the legal assistance they receive. They can do so
more effectively than can most people, however, because of their relative
sophistication and their repeated involvement with similar legal problems,
which produces some familiarity with the law. Because corporations often
use several sets of lawyers for different functions,96 they can to -some ex-
tent compare the quality of their lawyers' work and use different sets of
lawyers to review each other's work. However, corporations generally do
not receive numerous, relatively uniform bits of legal assistance from dif-
ferent lawyers. As a result, they cannot easily compare the benefits of the
legal assistance provided by various lawyers.
Third, lawyers' financial dependence on their clients does not yield a
very refined form of control."7 Because continuous assistance is valuable,98
switching lawyers is costly. Corporations attempt to counter their limited
94. As William Simon suggests, when a lawyer represents a corporation, he serves a group of
people acting though an "impersonal institution." Id. at 504-05. Simon argues that the bar has "ratio-
nalized loyalty to established organizations," primarily corporations, despite its assertion that "the
attorney-client relation is personal and unique," by "treating the organizations as persons entitled to
personal care and trust." Id. at 503, 505. However, this fiction is not employed in the public interest
context. Compare ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION
5-18 (1980) (lawyer representing corporation owes "allegiance" not to individuals but to "entity")
with id., ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 2-33 (lawyer working with legal assistance organization must be
loyal to "interests of individual clients").
95. See G. HAZARD, supra note 42, at 43-57 (lawyer retained by organization must resolve con-
flicts by conscious choice because "Ic]lient identity is ambiguous" and "continuously problematic");
Stewart, supra note 14, at 1765 n.457 (corporate lawyer may have difficulty identifying client's inter-
ests because of "conflicting aims of corporate officials").
96. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 52, at 205 (corporations with legal departments
also hire private firms).
97. Much of the following analysis is informed by Albert Hirschman's examination of accounta-
bility. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
98. See pp. 1446-47 supra (describing ability of groups with ongoing assistance to exploit legal
system).
1454
Vol. 90: 1436, 1981
Public Interest Practice
ability to control their lawyers through indirect, market pressures by es-
tablishing highly interactive relationships with their lawyers." By expres-
sing its preferences and dissatisfactions to its lawyers on a continuing basis
and by integrating them into its organization, a corporation encourages its
lawyers to assume the corporation's perspective.
Fourth, accountability is problematic in a more fundamental sense be-
cause lawyers actually shape their clients' aspirations and feelings of dis-
satisfaction."'0 Thus clients' judgments about whether their lawyers' ac-
tions have served their interests are affected by the type of legal advice
and counseling the lawyers have provided. This problem is less serious in
the corporate context than in other lawyer-client relationships, however,
because corporations tend to have more fully defined goals.'
2. Methods for Increasing Lawyer Accountability
Although the problem of lack of accountability is not unique to the
public interest lawyer nor completely remediable, it is still appropriate to
seek to maximize the accountability of the public interest lawyer to her
client group. Several strategies similar to those used in the corporate con-
text can be pursued to create a type of accountability in the public interest
context.
If the client group that a public interest lawyer seeks to represent is
organized, she can rely on the organization to articulate the preferences of
the group. °0 If the organization's membership is broad enough, the law-
yer might simply take the organization directly as her client. She can also
help organize her clients. Representatives of the client group can be cho-
sen to exercise advisory and policymaking power in the public interest law
organization. 0 1 Because of the difficulty of organizing many client groups
99. Cf A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 97, at 15-16, 21-29, 33-36, 80 (contrasting "exit"-"neat,"
"impersonal," "indirect" form of control-with "voice"-direct articulation of preferences, which is
needed to maintain accountability when exit is ineffective or otherwise unappealing).
100. See pp. 1445, 1448 supra (lawyers' advice and individuals' perception of available legal rem-
edies shape preferences for legal services).
101. However, if a corporation wished to respect "fair" legal constraints as well as maximize
profits, lawyers might influence the corporation's conception of fairness and thus affect its evaluation
of the legal services it receives.
102. See note 75 supra (public interest lawyers often represent client organizations); Note, supra
note 12, at 1125 (California Rural Legal Assistance guideline for class actions requires consultation
with affected poverty organizations). But c Stewart, supra note 14, at 1767 (organizations often
purport to represent nonmembers; no method for determining how representative they are).
103. Several organizations concerned with public interest law have advocated this strategy. See,
e.g., NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK OF STANDARDS 2-3 (1970)
(advisory committee of community residents); Cahn & Cahn, supra note 15, at 1041 n.45 (ABA
Standing Committee on Legal Aid adopted resolution in 1970 proposing Clients' Councils be estab-
lished to evaluate legal services programs). Public interest law groups have created various types of
advisory groups to represent clients' interests. See, e.g., Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New
Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805, 829 (1967) (many Office of Economic
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and of ensuring that the chosen voice is truly representative, the public
interest lawyer should also investigate and solicit the preferences of the
unorganized segments of these groups.104 The lawyer must also acknowl-
edge the possibility of conflicts of interest among factions within the client
group on particular issues and facilitate separate representation of the va-
rious interests.
05
Public interest lawyers should attempt to educate their clients.0 6 Legal
knowledge reduces clients' dependence on lawyers and enables them more
effectively to monitor the lawyers' work. If there are several public inter-
est law groups attempting to serve one broadly defined client group, the
clients have several independent sources of information they can use to
judge the quality of the legal services they receive.
A plurality of legal groups also creates the possibility of market-type
accountability. Clients can seek out another public interest group if they
are dissatisfied with the assistance they obtain. Choices might also be pro-
vided within particular public interest legal groups by instructing clients
that they can request a different lawyer from the group if they are dissat-
isfied with their lawyer's service. These mechanisms allow clients to ex-
press their complaints effectively without having to articulate them so
forcefully and persuasively that the original lawyer will change her
practice.
Decentralization would facilitate the operation of several of these mech-
anisms. Public interest lawyers, like in-house corporate counsel, could op-
erate from within the communities they assist. 07 For example, public in-
Opportunity (OEO) legal services programs attempted to place poor on board of trustees or separate
advisory panels). But see C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 48 (1970) (noting
findings that low socio-economic status correlates with low participation); p. 1439 supra (public inter-
est lawyers' clients often unskilled and unmotivated). Efforts to induce participation in legal services
programs have seldom been successful. See Note, supra, at 829 (OEO legal services programs); c.
Rosenbaum, The Paradoxes of Public Participation, 8 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 355 (1976) (federal social
programs).
104. Some public interest lawyers have imposed this type of requirement on themselves. See, e.g.,
NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 103, at 5-6 (standards require law-
yers to consult served community on priorities in many ways, e.g., meetings, discussions with repre-
sentatives, and surveys).
105. If there are several public interest law groups representing a single client group, different
lawyers can present the various positions held by members of the group. In class actions, members of
the class whose interests diverge from the named plaintiff may be able to intervene. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(d)(2) (conditions for permissive intervention); Bell, supra note 10, at 509-11 (encouraging use of
subclasses in desegregation litigation). The lawyers may also be able to persuade their clients not to
raise issues on which there is conflict in order to pursue shared goals more effectively.
106. See, e.g., F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 89, at 315-18 (Office of Economic Opportu-
nity legal aid offices trained poor as "lay advocates" in 1960s); note 88 supra (describing some of
public interest lawyers' efforts to educate their clients).
107. See Note, supra note 103, at 833 (lawyers in neighborhood legal services program should be
"surrounded by poor people"); c. Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized
System of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37-41 (1973) (describing role of neighborhood attor-
ney in decentralized criminal justice system); Tapp & Levine, supra note 38, at 59 ("Lawyers... can
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terest lawyers can operate local branch offices or work through and with
community-based lawyers.'08 Although they may serve a broad clientele,
the lawyers would thus interact continuously with a particular, represen-
tative segment of that clientele. Decentralization would increase the inter-
action between lawyers and clients, facilitating the organization and edu-
cation of clients and the identification of clients' interests. It would also
improve clients' ability to choose between different groups of public inter-
est lawyers. If client groups are served by lawyers who are members of
the group they serve or who live and work among their clients and thus
develop empathy for them, the lawyers' influence on their clients' aspira-
tions and feelings of dissatisfaction is less problematic.
A fuller theoretical analysis of the role of the public interest lawyer
thus makes it possible to identify methods of remedying genuine problems
and to justify practices that are integral to the effective practice of public
interest law.
usefully function as 'house counsel' for a community.")
108. See Rabin, supra note 24, at 224 (national offices of NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. and
ACLU work with local "cooperating attorneys" and branches respectively). The Legal Services Cor-
poration supports 12 "back-up" centers, each concerned with an area of law relevant to poor people,
see A. POLIKOFF, supra note 26, as well as numerous community offices. Many other centralized
public interest groups consult informally with a network of community-based legal services lawyers
and social services groups interested in the same issues as the public interest lawyers.
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